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2.1  Issues 
In  1984, with the aim of  helping the pension system remain solvent, the 
Japanese Ministry of Welfare proposed a major revision of the Social Security 
system that included reducing future benefits and raising the minimum eligibil- 
ity age from 60 to 65. This proposal triggered a debate about whether the fi- 
nancial status of the pension system should take precedence over the employ- 
ment problems of elderly workers. In fact, the employment problems of elderly 
workers are closely related to the strain on the Social Security system caused 
by  the rapidly aging population; such a plan would be likely to increase the 
labor supply of  elderly workers, thus necessitating new government policies 
that would create more job opportunities for this labor pool. The Ministry of 
Welfare ultimately decided to postpone raising the minimum retirement age, 
although the remainder of the proposal was approved in 1985. 
In an extraordinary Diet session in the fall of  1989, the Ministry of Welfare 
resubmitted a proposal to raise the minimum age of  eligibility for receiving 
Social Security benefits from 60 to 65. Although the proposal was to raise the 
age of eligibility gradually over a period of twenty years, it was not accepted 
in the Diet. The decision obviously reflected the new political situation created 
shortly after the election of the House of Counselors, which was a landslide 
victory for the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) vis-8-vis the Liberal Democratic 
Party. The major reason why opposition parties, led by the JSP, were opposed 
to raising the minimum eligibility age was that there was no prevalent employ- 
ment practice or institutional guarantee that workers older than age 60 would 
continue to be employed up to age 65. 
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Taking this point seriously, the Ministry of  Labor proposed a plan to the 
tripartite Employment Policy Council to be examined as a preliminary step 
toward formulating an actual bill. It proposed  that employers should be re- 
quired to keep elderly employees on the payroll up to the age of 65. This pro- 
posal met with strenuous opposition from employers. Employers assert that, 
since the proposal  to raise the minimum eligibility  age from 60 to 65 was 
rejected, there is no need to legislate that employers must employ elderly work- 
ers up to the age of  65. Moreover, they predict that, in the long run, they will 
have to employ more elderly workers in the face of an increasingly  severe 
shortage in the young labor force. In other words, they are implying that the 
employment problems of elderly workers will, in the long run, be solved spon- 
taneously by market forces. Whether employment opportunities will be redis- 
tributed adequately across different age classes through market forces, how- 
ever, is certainly an interesting academic and serious policy question that has 
yet to be answered. 
When one puts the current policy debate over modifying the Social Security 
system and policy interventions in employment practices into a broader and 
more analytic perspective, one should recognize that the debated issues should 
be located in a system of  key variables that dictate the behavior of the relevant 
principal  actors, namely,  the  labor  suppliers,  the  employers,  and  the  gov- 
ernment. 
The labor supply depends on the level of unearned income, on the one hand, 
and the availability of employment opportunities, on the other. To  be more 
specific, the higher the level of pension benefits, the lower the likelihood of a 
person supplying labor, and the greater the employment opportunities in the 
labor market, the higher the willingness to supply labor. 
Employers make employment decisions on the basis of the expected returns 
from employment. In other words, the employer employs a worker as long as 
he can expect to benefit in the form of productivity in excess of  wages. The 
calculus of employment decisions is often based on the long term. That is, the 
benefit accruing from employment is calculated in terms of some sort of pres- 
ent value of the future stream of benefits. 
In the Japanese labor market, employers display a systematic bias toward 
certain age classes, apparently preferring to employ young workers, not older. 
This bias  seems to be  clearly  reflected  in  the  differences  among  the job 
opening/applicant ratios compiled by the public employment service offices 
for different age classes. 
Why are there such conspicuous differences? Is it because employers tend 
to avoid recruiting older workers? If so, is this because employers perceive that 
older workers cost more by receiving high wages but do not contribute as much 
in terms of productivity? Is it because employers do not expect to get as much 
return from their human investment in older workers as from their investment 
in younger workers? Or is it because of the effect of such institutional arrange- 
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ployment opportunities across different age classes can be altered depends on 
the relative values of  and relations among these economic and institutional 
variables. 
Basically, the government has two categories of policy instrument that affect 
or  control the  demand-supply balance  of  elderly  workers.  One  is  public 
income-maintenance programs such as Social Security. Many studies of labor 
supply behavior suggest that, the higher the level of pension benefits, the lower 
the likelihood of an older person joining the labor supply. The other is what 
may be called an active employment policy. The Japanese government, for ex- 
ample, has been promoting this kind of employment policy in two ways: pro- 
viding subsidies for employers who employ older workers and controlling or 
guiding the behavior of employers through laws or guidelines. 
These two types of policy instrument-income-maintenance  programs and 
active employment policies-are  mutually dependent and closely related. For 
instance, the labor supply of older people depends on their perceived employ- 
ment opportunities, on the one hand, and on the level of guaranteed income, 
on the other. The former is determined by  a set of  variables, as mentioned 
above, that dictates the behavior of  employers and also by the government’s 
employment policy. The latter is determined by  the government’s income- 
maintenance programs. The financial viability of  such government programs 
depends on the degree to which old people work in the labor market and con- 
tribute to the funds of such programs. 
When we evaluate the implications of these policy instruments, we also need 
to take into account dynamic changes in demand-supply balances over a long 
period of  time. While logically we may  be concerned with a likely relative 
excess supply of older people as a consequence of the recent revamping of the 
Social Security system, when put in the perspective of an increasingly dimin- 
ishing supply of  younger labor in the long run, that excess supply may  be 
viewed positively, not negatively. Such an interpretation, however, would natu- 
rally depend on how flexibly the employment system and employment prac- 
tices react and adapt to new external market conditions. We  should also keep 
in mind the question of whether the distribution of employment opportunities 
can be justified on the grounds of securing minimum social needs for all. 
Having acknowledged the issues surrounding these policy debates, we may 
now  identify a few important and relevant research questions. One is what 
effect public income-maintenance  programs such as the Social Security system 
have on the labor supply behavior of older workers. Another is whether em- 
ployment opportunities for older workers will increase in the future as the re- 
sult of a change in the behavior of employers. Still another question is whether, 
and to what extent the government’s employment policy will actually create 
new jobs for the elderly or redistribute existing jobs among the workforce, 
targeting the elderly. In this paper, we confine ourselves to the question of the 
effect of public pension benefits on the labor supply behavior of the elderly. 
One interesting observation lies in the apparent correlation between the de- 46  Atsushi Seike and Haruo Shimada 
clining labor force participation by the Japanese elderly and the increasingly 
high benefit payments disbursed by  the Social Security system (see fig. 2.1). 
The labor force participation  rate of elderly Japanese workers declined from 
57 percent in  1960 to 36 percent  in  1990, a drop of  20 percentage  points. 
By contrast, the average monthly  Social Security benefit  (in  1985 yen) rose 
substantially during the  same period, from Y16,OOO  in  1960 to Y130,OOO  in 
1990, and the ratio of the benefit to the average wage increased from 15 to 40 
percent. This suggests that the progressive rise in pension benefits may have 
encouraged more workers to retire early, thereby reducing the supply of elderly 
workers. This contrast in time trends may, however, be coincidental. To deter- 
mine what effect, if any, the rise in pension benefits has had on the labor force 
participation  of  elderly workers, we undertook a rigorous cross-sectional ex- 
amination of the data. 
2.2  The Social Security System in Japan 
In this section, we briefly describe the Japanese Social Security insurance 
system  and  the changes that  this  system has  undergone  over  the  past  two 
decades.  Because  we are mainly  interested  in  determining  what  effect  the 
Social Security system has had on the behavior of employed people, we will 
be discussing Social Security for employed people. 
Social Security for employed people (Kosei-Nenkin)  in Japan is the public 
pension system that covers all Japanese employees who work in private busi- 
nesses that employ at least five persons. As of 1990, about 32 million workers 
were insured through the system, and 8 million beneficiaries  were collecting 
retirement pensions. 
To be eligible to collect a pension, a worker must fulfill three criteria: (1) he 
must have made at least 240 months’ worth of  accumulated contributions to 
the system (or 180 months’ worth, accumulated after age 40);’ (2) he must be 
at least 60 years of age; and (3) his earnings must be less than the ceiling level. 
The third condition warrants further explanation. First, in the context of  the 
Social Security system, the term retirement signifies retirement from a job spe- 
cifically covered by that system. Thus, workers not paying Social Security con- 
tributions from their earnings are considered to be retired. Accordingly, a per- 
son employed at a noncovered workplace after retirement from a covered job 
is regarded as a retiree.* Second, to collect pension benefits, workers are not 
required to retire completely from a covered job, as long as their earnings do 
not exceed a certain maximum amount specified by a schedule known as the 
earnings test. Those workers choosing to continue in the workforce are called 
1. ln some employment categories, there are exceptions to the number of months of contribu- 
tions required; e.g., for coal miners, one month of  contribution is counted as four-thirds of  a 
month. 
2. It is possible for people retired from the private sector to be government employees. This 
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Rate of  Benefit 
Age Group  Monthly Earnings (u)  Reduction (%) 
60-64  0  0 
1-94.999  20 
95,000-1 29,999  50 
130,000-154,999  80 
155,000+  100 
65 +  < 155,000  0 
155,000+  20 
Source: Trends of  Insurance and Pensions (Tokyo: Welfare  Statistics Association, 1990). 
working beneficiaries. Working beneficiaries collect only a specified percent- 
age of their full pensions. 
The ceiling level of the Social Security benefit is reduced according to the 
amount earned, as shown in table 2.1, with the rate of reduction varying ac- 
cording to the age group within which a worker falls. For workers between 60 
and 64  years of age, for example, the rate of reduction can be as great as 100 
percent, whereas, for workers aged 65 and older, the maximum reduction is 20 48  Atsushi Seike and Haruo Shimada 
percent. This earnings test poses problems that will be discussed in  greater 
detail below. 
The dotted curve in figure 2.1 shows trends in Social Security benefits paid 
to beneficiaries (in 1985 yen). As a result of  revisions in the pension formula, 
there  were  significant increases  in benefit levels in  1965, 1969, and  1973. 
Of  these increases, the  1973 jump was particularly noteworthy in that, after 
this time, pension benefits were indexed to adjust for inflation; accordingly, the 
real value of  each benefit level increased to twice the previous value.3 Since 
1973, benefits have continued to rise steadily to compensate for the rate of in- 
flation. 
Another factor that we must examine in connection with the recent rise in 
pension benefits is the maturity of the Social Security pension system itself. In 
the past, very few workers were able to contribute to the pension system for a 
period sufficient to qualify them to collect regular benefits. In the late 1970s, 
however, the first group of workers who had contributed for the requisite num- 
ber of months began to reach retirement age. Hence, the number of employee 
pension beneficiaries increased from 0.6  million in 1970 to 7.8 million in 1990, 
and the number of persons receiving the maximum benefit grew commensu- 
rately. As the benefit level rose, the ratio of the pension benefit amount to the 
average monthly wage also grew dramatically, increasing from 10 percent in 
the early  1960s to almost 40 percent in the  1980s (see fig. 2.1);4 excluding 
bonus payments, which constitute as much as 30 percent of a worker’s wages, 
the ratio is about 60 percent. The most recent major revision of the pension 
system, in 1985, was aimed at reducing future benefit levels in order to keep 
the current relative ratio constant. The Social Security benefit trend shown in 
figure 2.1 suggests that the Social Security system matured in the 1980s. 
2.3  Analytic Framework 
In this section, we discuss the empirical framework of our study. First, we 
estimate the standard labor supply model originally developed by  Heckman 
(1979) and modified and expanded by others (see, e.g., the studies in Smith 
[  19801). 
Suppose that Wr  and W, are the reservation wage and the market wage, re- 
spectively. The reservation wage is the minimum wage for which an individual 
will work, and the market wage is the wage offered by potential employers. 
We may then write the reservation wage and market wage functions as 
3. The Employee Pension Insurance Law provides that benefits be  indexed when consumer 
prices increase by more than 5 percent in any given year, but, as a result of political considerations, 
benefits have been indexed even in years when the inflation rate was less than 5 percent. 
4.  The Social Security system is based on the monthly wage, excluding bonuses. For example, 
the standard monthly wage on which the Social Security contribution is paid-and  on which the 
benefit is calculated-is  the average monthly wage for May, June, and July. Bonuses are generally 
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where X  is the vector of variables affecting an individual worker’s reservation 
wage and includes the worker’s income-leisure preference, income from non- 
labor sources such as pension benefits, and some institutional factors affecting 
the labor supply decisi~n;~  Y is the vector of variables affecting market earning 
power and includes a worker’s productivity and the factors of demand for this 
side of the labor market; OL and p are vectors of parameters; and U,  and Urn  are 
normally distributed random errors. Thus, the condition for participation in the 
labor market is 
This equation means that a person will decide to participate in the labor market 
if the market wage offered exceeds his reservation wage. 
In terms of labor supply expressed as hours worked, any person whose reser- 
vation wage exceeds his market wage has zero hours of work. Persons whose 
market wage is higher than their reservation wage supply a positive number of 
hours of  work. The number of  hours that a person supplies depends on the 
same variables in X  above and on the market wage.6 Thus, the hours-worked 
function is defined as 
(4)  H  = yX + cWm + U,, 
H  = 0, 
if  Wm -  Wr > 0, 
if  Wm -  W, < 0, 
where y and c are the vector of parameters and a parameter, respectively, and 
U, is a normally distributed random error term. 
Because from our data the number of hours worked and wages can be ob- 
served only for persons who are actually working, there is well-known prob- 
lem of sample selectivity bias in estimating the labor supply and market wage 
functions, as elucidated by Heckman (1979). In order to cope with this prob- 
lem, we estimate these functions using Heckman’s two-stage estimation proce- 
dure.’ In applying the estimation procedure, we first estimated the probit par- 
ticipation equation. The likelihood function has the form 
(5)  In  L = C In  PJW, -  W, > 0) + C In  P,(w,  -  w,. <  01, 
where N, is the number in the working sample, and N, is the number in the 
total sample. As a by-product of the participation probit estimation, we have 
Nw  NT 
I  NW+I 
5. The participation cost is often included in the reservation wage. In this study, we did not 
6.  Because we do not include the participation cost, the reservation-wage vector is identical to 
7. LIMDEP, a statistical software package, was used to correct for selectivity. 
include this factor because our data are inadequate for this purpose. 
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the lambda variable, which corrects for selectivity bias. The market wage and 
hours-worked equations incorporating the lambda variable are defined as: 
(6)  ln(W,)  = PY + bh + V,, 
(7)  H = yX  + c ln(W,)  + dh + V,, 
where P and A are vectors of parameters; b, c,  and d are parameters; and V,,, 
and V, are random terms. These equations are then estimated jointly. 
In the context of the analytic framework set forth above, the Social Security 
benefit is one component of the vector X  that is supposed to affect a person’s 
labor supply behavior both when making the decision to participate and when 
determining the optimal number of hours to work. Therefore, the coefficients 
of the Social Security benefit in the parameter vectors (Y and y constitute the 
main targets of this paper. 
In examining the magnitude of the effect of Social Security pensions on the 
labor supply, it is important that one check the stability of the parameters of 
the labor supply functions that reflect the effect of pension benefits. In order 
to do this, we make an inter-cross-sectional comparison by  using micro data 
for 1980 and 1983. In this inter-cross-sectional comparison, we estimated only 
a reduced-form probit function for labor force participation in which the mar- 
ket wage rate is taken from an aggregate data source matched with the available 
individual characteristics of the micro data. We do this because the 1980 data 
lack information on working hours and wage rates. The probit function has 
the form 
(8) 
where W is the market wage rate taken from aggregate data8 
As shown in figure 2.2, the earnings test creates a kink in the beneficiary’s 
budget constraint. Suppose that CJ  is the original budget line for a person with 
the market earning power of wage rate W,,, and OC of nonpension, nonearnings 
income. If this person has the right to receive CA  of the Social Security benefit 
and there is no earnings test, the budget line shifts from CJ to AK. The earnings 
test, however, results in a kinked budget line like ABDFGJ for those 60-64 
years old. This budget-constraint kink is substantial for eligible workers be- 
tween 60 and 64. The budget-constraint kink means that, for a given market 
wage rate, those supplying more labor must give up a greater proportion of 
their Social Security benefits. 
This gives rise to the problem of a simultaneity bias in estimating the coef- 
ficient of Social Security benefits in the labor supply functions (i.e., the partici- 
pation  and hours-worked functions). The estimated coefficient of  the Social 
Security benefit may have a negative bias because it reflects not only the effect 
prob(work/not work) =  fiw  X), 
8. The studies of  Boskin (1977) and Quinn (1977) estimate the same kinds of  reduced-form 
logit functions derived from a simple individual equilibrium model. 51  Social Security Benefits and Labor Supply of the Elderly in Japan 
r1 =  94,999 yen per month 
r2 =  129,999 yen per month 
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Fig. 2.2  The individual equilibrium at the kinked point of budget constraint 
and earnings distribution 
of the pension benefit on the labor supply but also the effect of the quantity of 
labor on the benefit leveL9  In order to estimate the influence of the Social Secu- 
rity benefit on labor supply behavior without introducing this bias, we used a 
dummy variable for Social Security eligibility that should be independent of 
labor supply behavior. 
In order to examine the effects of the earnings test on the distribution  of 
earnings, we directly observe the distribution of earnings of workers who were 
and were not eligible for a pension. With the caveat noted above, we would 
expect working beneficiaries to select equilibrium points such as D in figure 
2.2 so that their earnings are concentrated around the Y94,999 ceiling.'O 
9. A rigorous investigation of the nonlinear effects of the Social Security earnings test on the 
labor supply would require the estimation of maximum likelihood models similar to those of Haus- 
man (1980) and Zabalza, Pissarides, and Barton (1980). Unlike the U.S. or British cases in which 
the budget constraint is kinked, the Japanese earnings test creates notch-like budget lines similar 
to those illustrated in fig. 2.2. This difference arises because the Japanese earnings test takes the 
form of a lump-sum tax rather than a change in the marginal tax rate. Furthermore, this notched 
budget constraint makes possible the existence of dual equilibria; e.g., at one of the peak points 
(D)  as well as at a point on D'F; the slope of the adjoining segment of the budget line depending 
on the level of benefits. Incorporating these features of the Japanme Social Security earnings test 
into a maximum likelihood model is complex and beyond the scope of this paper. 
10. Although for eligible workers age 60-64  the ranges ABD and part of  G'J of the budget 
constraint could be the equilibrium points in the cases shown in fig. 2.2, part of D'F and part of 
F'G become possible equilibrium points if the benefit is small. The theoretically impossible range 
for the equilibrium is at the trough of the constraint line shown next to point D. According to our 
data, shown in sec. 2.6 below, people do in fact have earnings corresponding to this range, which 
suggests that workers do not have complete freedom to choose their working hours because of 
demand-side constraints. 52  Atsushi Seike and Haruo Shimada 
2.4  Data and Variable Definitions Data 
The data used in this analysis were extracted from the Employment Status 
Survey of the Elderly, which was conducted by the Japanese Ministry of Labor. 
The sample population surveyed was chosen to be representative  of persons 
55-69  years of age. 
The most important feature of this data set is that it is the only collection of 
micro data in Japan that contains  information on the employment  status of 
elderly workers, including data with which to estimate labor supply and market 
wage functions for individual workers as well as input on past and current job 
experience. Also available are data on Social Security, including facts about 
those who were collecting benefits at the time of the report as well as those 
who were potentially eligible to do so. 
Although surveys were conducted in both  1980 and 1983, the 1980 data set 
lacks details on hours worked and wage rates, and therefore it is used only for 
estimating the reduced-form probit function of equation (8). In estimating this 
equation,  we used the Japanese Ministry  of  Labor’s Basic Survey of  Wage 
Structure (BSWS), which represents aggregate wage data as the outside infor- 
mation about wages. The BSWS, the most detailed aggregate wage survey pub- 
lished to date, covers all workers in business with more than ten employees, 
categorizing wage rates by both worker and employer characteristics. 
Since we are particularly interested in the effect of Social Security on labor 
supply behavior, we selected a sample population consisting of males 60 years 
of age and older-the  eligible age range for collecting Social Security benefits. 
We focused on the male sample because of its trend toward declining labor 
force participation and also because the number of female workers participat- 
ing in the Social Security system is still limited. 
2.4.1  Variables 
The following explanatory variables affecting the reservation wage are the 
elements of  the variable vector X  of equations (l), (4), (7), and (8); for the 
market wage, they are the elements of  the variable vector  Y in equations (2) 
and (6). 
Age. Age is an explanatory variable for both the reservation wage and the mar- 
ket wage. A person’s preference for leisure may  shift upward  with age, and 
diminishing physical ability may curtail his market productivity, thus reducing 
his market wage. 
Health. Health is also an explanatory variable for both the reservation  wage 
and the market wage. If a person has health problems, his preference for leisure 
may  increase, and his market productivity  may decrease,  thus reducing his 
market wage. We made the dummy variable HEALTHDMY equal to one if 
health problems exist and zero otherwise. 53  Social Security Benefits and Labor Supply of the Elderly in Japan 
Mandatory  retirement. Mandatory retirement is a widespread employment 
practice among Japanese firms. Although mandatory retirement from a pri- 
mary job does not preclude a worker's participation in the labor force, it does 
constitute a potent institutional barrier. At the same time, those workers who 
have left their primary jobs through mandatory retirement have the opportunity 
to engage in other jobs that allow them to work fewer hours. Mandatory retire- 
ment may have a negative effect both on the decision to participate in the labor 
force and on hours worked; thus, it is an explanatory variable for the reserva- 
tion wage. Moreover, in the Japanese wage system, wages increase with age 
and length of service up to the mandatory retirement age. After a worker man- 
datorily retires from his primary job, his wages drop dramatically if he chooses 
to remain in the labor force. Therefore, mandatory retirement may also have a 
negative effect on the market wage. To control for these effects, we introduced 
an indicator variable for mandatory retirement. We  made the dummy variable 
MANDRETDMY equal to one if the worker has experienced mandatory retire- 
ment and zero otherwise. 
Nonwage income. In general, individuals with higher nonwage incomes have 
higher reservation wages and hence tend to work less. In this study, we divided 
nonwage income sources into two  categories: Social Security benefits and 
other nonwage income (NONPEN). We did so, not only because we are partic- 
ularly interested in the effect of Social Security, but also because the earnings 
test affects Social Security and because, since only Social Security is indexed 
for inflation, it may therefore be a more reliable permanent income source than 
other pensions."  As  discussed in section 2.3 above, we estimated the labor 
supply functions with this variable to confirm the effect of Social Security on 
labor supply behavior without the simultaneity bias. In order to avoid the bias, 
we introduced an indicator variable for Social Security eligibility that is com- 
pletely independent of labor supply behavior (PENELGDMY). We  made the 
dummy variable PENELGDMY equal to one if the worker is eligible to collect 
Social Security and zero otherwise. This includes all those who satisfy the 
months-of-contribution requirements. 
Education. Education is an important explanatory variable for the market wage 
Y because highly employed workers are thought to be more productive in the 
labor market and hence more likely to receive higher wages. Educational at- 
tainment is measured by  two categorical variables: (1) completion of  high 
school and (2) graduation from a four-year college. The reference group (omit- 
ted) consists of those who have completed the minimum level of compulsory 
schooling. We  made the dummy variable HIGHSCHL equal to one if  the 
worker completed high school and zero otherwise and also made COLLEGE 
equal to one if the person received a college degree and zero otherwise. 
11. On the other hand, most company pensions are not indexed and, rather than being annuities, 
are limited-term (usually ten-year) pensions. 54  Atsushi Seike and Haruo Shimada 
Location. Because business activities are concentrated mainly in the Tokyo 
metropolitan area, there is a significant difference between labor demand con- 
ditions there and in the rest of Japan. For this reason, a Tokyo metropolitan 
area indicator variable was introduced to control for this labor demand factor. 
We made the dummy variable TOKYOMETDMY equal to one if  the person 
was living in the Tokyo metropolitan area and zero otherwise. 
2.5  Empirical Results 
The results of  estimating the probit participation function of  equation (5) 
are shown in table 2.2.  In order to look at the magnitude of the effect of each 
variable, we will show the 3 prob/3 var instead of the probit coefficients them- 
selves.'* As shown in table 2.2,  all coefficients are statistically significant, and 
all parameter signs are consistent with those predicted. 
The Social Security variables are negative and highly statistically signifi- 
cant. The highly significant negative coefficient of  the dummy variable for 
Social Security eligibility (PENELGDMY), which is independent of the labor 
supply decision, confirms the negative effect of Social Security on the partici- 
pation decision. The probit coefficient of PENELGDMY implies that eligibil- 
ity for Social Security reduces the participation probability by  15 percent. 
Table 2.3 shows the results of estimating the market wage function of equa- 
tion (6). We estimated the wage equation for the working male sample popula- 
tion. These estimates were corrected for  sample-selectivity bias  using the 
lambda variable estimated from the participation function reported in table 
2.2 above. 
All coefficients are statistically significant, and all signs are theoretically 
consistent. The most significant coefficients are the indicator variables related 
to education. Having either a high school or a college education increases the 
market wage of an individual even when he is in his 60s. The statistical sig- 
nificance of  lambda indicates the importance of  correcting for selectivity in 
estimating a wage equation for the working sample. 
The results of estimating the hours-worked function of equation (8) are pre- 
sented in table 2.4 in conjunction with the results from estimating the market 
wage function. All estimated coefficients are statistically significant, and their 
signs are consistent with those predicted, although the significance level of the 
wage rate (LOGWFIT) is low. 
The coefficients of the Social Security variables are significantly negative. 
The negative effect of  Social Security on hours worked is confirmed by the 
coefficient of the Social Security eligibility dummy variable. 
The above results definitely show that Social Security in Japan significantly 
reduces the labor supply of pension-eligible older people. How stable is this 
12. Concerning the procedure of deriving a prob/a var from probit coefficients, see Judge et 
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AGE  -.017092*** 
HE ALTHDMY  -.33  1203*** 
HIGHSCHLDMY  .036605 *** 
COLLEGEDMY  .087208** 
PENELGDMY  -  .152729*** 
Table 2.2  Empirical Results of the Participation  Function (probit estimation) 
Variable  a Prob/a var  I  Variable  a Probla Var 
NONPEN  -  .000223*** 
MANDRETDMY  -. 171402*** 
TOKYOMETDMY  ,05635  1  * ** 
Log likelihood  -3,859.3 
Sample size  7,014 
Specification 2 (with lambda 
from participation function 
with EP eligibility dummy 
Variable  [PENELGDMY]) 
**Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
Specification 2 (with lambda 
from participation function 
with EP eligibility dummy 
Variable  [PENELGDMY]) 
Table 2.3  Empirical Results for the Market Wage Function 
ONE  1.2628  1  *** 
AGE  -.0280409*** 
HEALTHDMY  -  .28  1854*** 
HIGHSCHLDMY  .390829*  *  * 
COLLEGEDMY  .699619*** 
TOKYOMETDMY  .2  1099*** 
MANDRETDMY  -.361453*** 
LAMBDA  .543983*** 
R2  ,127 
- 
Sample size  4,559 
Specification 2 (with EP 
eligibility dummy 
Variable  [PENELGDMY]) 
Note: EP = employee’s pension. 
***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level 
Specification 2 (with EP 
eligibility dummy 
Variable  [PENELGDMY]) 
ONE  446.642*** 
AGE  -4.08734*** 
HEALTHDMY  -5  1.2706*** 
MANDRETDMY  -24.0737*** 
PENELGDMY  -11.9709** 
NONPEN  -.03992*** 
LOGWFIT  9.40996* 
LAMBDA  5 1.3899*** 
R2  ,050 
- 
Sample size  4,559 
Note:  EP = employee’s pension. 
*Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
**Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
Social Security effect over  time? Table 2.5  compares the  1980 and  1983 
reduced-form participation functions of equation (8). We  estimated the func- 
tion using the Social Security benefit (PENEBENFT) because the 1980 data 
do not include information on Social Security eligibility. 
To compare the magnitude of the effect of Social Security benefits on partic- 
ipation behavior, we divided the wage rate and pension variables from the 1983 56  Atsushi Seike and Haruo Shimada 
data by  the  consumer price  index  to convert these  variables  to their  1980 
constant-price values. 
All parameters are statistically significant, and their signs are consistent with 
those predicted. The magnitude of the effect of  a unit change in the Social 
Security benefit on the probability of participation (3  prob/3 var), or the effect 
of  Social Security benefits on the probability  of workforce participation,  is 
very similar in both samples:  -0.0025  and -0.0022,  respectively. This sug- 
gests that the effect of Social Security benefits on the labor supply was stable 
during the early 1980s. 
2.6  The Earnings Test and Its Effects 
In section 2.3 above, we showed that the earnings test associated with Social 
Security benefits creates a kink in the budget line of an eligible worker in this 
age group. With this kinked budget line, the individual equilibrium points for 
working beneficiaries are likely to be located at the kink points, such as peak 
D of figure 2.2 above. To verify this, we examined the earnings distribution of 
working beneficiaries. If  working beneficiaries put their equilibrium point at 
D, their earnings will tend to be concentrated  at the ceiling of  the earnings 
range, which is 'Y94,999 (see fig. 2.2). 
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show the earnings distributions of eligible and noneli- 
gible workers. To control for all conditions except eligibility for Social Secu- 
rity  benefits,  we  selected  a  sample of  workers  age  60-64,  without  health 
limitations, who were employed full-time at age 55 and had experienced man- 
datory retirement prior to taking their current jobs. The earnings distribution 
of eligible workers shown in figure 2.3 is unimodal, with the peak occumng 
Table 2.5  Results of Estimating the Reduced-Form  Participation Function for 
1980 and 1983 
Coefficients of the Participation Function 
Variable 
1980 
a Prob/a Var 
1983: 









-  .0206565*** 





-4,813.2  - 
9,118 
-.0142349*** 
-  .3318242*** 
.1509132*** 
-  .OO22427*** 
-  .OOO3952*** 
-.  1301065*** 
-3,749.2 
7,014 
'WAGE  is the market wage rate taken from the Basic Survey of  Wage Structure (Tokyo: Ministry 
of Labor, annual). 
*Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 57  Social Security Benefits and Labor Supply of the Elderly in Japan 
Earnings Class 
(Ten thousand yen) 
Fig. 2.3  Earnings distribution of pension-eligible  workers 
in the earnings class that includes the ceiling of the earnings range associated 
with the 20 percent reduction in benefits (less than Y95,OOO). By contrast, the 
earnings distribution for noneligible workers (fig. 2.4) shows no such clear- 
cut tendency. 
The observed differences in the earnings of the two groups were also sub- 
jected to statistical tests. We  analyzed (1) the difference in the shape of  the 
earnings distribution curves and (2) the relative frequency of the earnings class 
that includes Y94,999 within the pension-eligible and -noneligible samples. 
To  test for statistical differences in the shape of  the earnings distribution 
curve, we used a rank-order test.I3 In terms of  the difference in the relative 
frequency of the earnings class including Y94,999, we used the usual propor- 
tional difference test. The results of these tests, displayed in table 2.6, indicate 
that the shapes of the earnings distribution curves and the relative frequencies 
are significantly  different; the chi-square test statistic exceeds the critical value 
in both cases. The earnings distribution of  eligible workers, compared with 
that of noneligible workers, shows an equilibrium point at the kink in the bud- 
get line, a result that we attribute to the Social Security earnings test. 
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Fig. 2.4  Earnings distribution of workers not eligible for pension 
2.7  Policy Implications 
These findings from the above analysis may have significant  implications 
for employment policy, particularly in connection with the recent restructuring 
of the Japanese Social Security system. Initially, the changes are likely to re- 
duce, or at least curb, increases in benefit levels as the pension-eligible popula- 
tion grows. This may in turn cause a rapid surge in the number of elderly work- 
ers  actively  seeking jobs,  and it may  therefore  be incumbent  on  Japanese 
society as a whole to provide  a substantial number of job opportunities for 
persons in this group. As a result of the effect of the Social Security earnings 
test, part-time employment opportunities are likely to be especially important 
for elderly workers. Policymakers attempting to meet the needs of older work- 
ers should give these points serious c~nsideration.'~ 
This result of the foregoing analysis stimulates at least three policy-related 
questions: (1) What is the direction of ongoing policy efforts? Are they moving 
toward increasing the employment opportunities for elderly workers to meet 
14. For a broader discussion of employment issues of  the aging in Japan, see Seike and Shi- 
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the needs likely arising from the reforms proposed by  the Japanese govern- 
ment? (2) What would be the long-term implications for the demand-supply 
balance of  elderly workers? (3) What would be an appropriate and workable 
institutional arrangement for providing employment opportunities for the el- 
derly, particularly in private corporations? 
The answer to the first question is obviously yes. The government has been 
earnestly advocating (sometimes pressing private corporations by  administra- 
tive guidance through employment service offices) that the age of mandatory 
retirement be raised in order to increase employment opportunities for the el- 
derly. Partly as a result of this effort, and partly owing to social pressures, an 
increasing number of private corporations have moved back the age for manda- 
tory retirement from 55 to 60 during the last decade. For example, while the 
share of corporations adopting the mandatory retirement age of 55 decreased 
from 39.5 percent in  1980 to 19.3 percent in 1990, those adopting the retire- 
ment age of 60 increased from 36.5 percent in 1980 to 60.1 percent in 1990. 
Although the higher mandatory retirement age is meant to increase full- 
time employment opportunities for the elderly as opposed to part-time jobs, as 
suggested by  the results of  our analysis, this policy move will certainly more 
than offset short- or medium-term concerns of a shortage of  employment op- 
portunities for the elderly if the policy objectives are actually realized in the 
labor market. 
This leads us to the second question regarding how the demand-supply bal- 
ance of  the labor market will be affected in the long run, particularly for the 
older portion of  the workforce. Most long-term estimates suggest that the 
growth in the labor supply will be increasingly smaller in the future. (For ex- 
ample, the EPA  [Economic Planning Agency] estimates that the average an- 
nual percentage increase in the labor force will be 0.9 percent for the period 
1985-95,  0.2 percent for 1995-2000,  and -0.1  percent for 2000-2010.  The 
Table 2.6  Statistical Significance  of the Differences in Earnings Distributions 
Type of Test  Chi Square  Critical Value 
Test of differences in the shape of 
the earnings distributions: 
H,:  F, = F,  ...  ... 
H,:  F,, >  F,  17.23  3.84 
Test of differences in proportion of 
each sample in the earnings class 
Y90,000-Y100,000: 
H,:  Pp + P, 
HI:  Pn  >  Pno  ,065  ,052 
Note: H,  = null hypothesis; HI = alternative hypothesis; Fp = earnings distribution of the pen- 
sion-eligible sample; F,  = earnings distribution of the noneligible sample; Pp  = proportion of the 
eligible sample in the earnings class Y90,000-Y100,000; P, = proportion of noneligible sample in 
the earnings class Y90,000-Y100,000. 60  Atsushi Seike and Haruo Shimada 
estimates were prepared by the EPA  Planning Bureau in 1989.) The expected 
increase in the supply of older labor may well be helpful in meeting the likely 
shortage of labor in the long-term future. In many areas of industry, a severe 
structural shortage in the labor force is already emerging. Industries such as 
construction,  agriculture,  and  labor-intensive  services  (e.g.,  computer  pro- 
gramming) are examples of this. What is needed is a reallocation of employ- 
ment  opportunities  among different  age classes of  the  workforce.  Whether 
such objectives can be achieved will depend largely on the response and behav- 
ior of employers. 
The third question therefore, is whether in the long run such a reallocation 
of employment opportunities can be effectively realized in the Japanese labor 
market. A critical question is whether Japanese employers will be prepared to 
provide good employment opportunities for elderly workers in such a way that 
they can both utilize their skills and experience effectively and earn a reason- 
able income. In most cases, the compulsory retirement system severs the rela- 
tionship between the older worker and the company in which he was working. 
The retired worker who is still seeking other employment opportunities ends 
up with jobs in which he can neither utilize his skills and experience effectively 
nor earn a decent income. A sensible way to bridge this gap may be found in 
utilizing what might be termed the quasi or extended internal labor market. 
This means that the worker does not stay in the company after the mandatory 
retirement age, but neither does he move to a totally unrelated job. The worker 
finds another employment opportunity in a company that is closely related to 
his old company so that he can utilize his skills and experience effectively and 
therefore has a better income than he would otherwise. In fact, utilization  of 
the “quasi internal labor market” is increasing in the sense that an increasing 
number of older workers find their next jobs in companies within the same 
group or related groups, as networks of corporate groups develop for various 
reasons. If Japanese corporations will provide more jobs of this type for older 
workers, and if the workers in turn will be able to find more employment op- 
portunities where they can utilize their talents effectively, then the proposed 
reform of Social Security may not have as disturbing an effect in distorting the 
demand-supply balance in the labor market over the long run as might at first 
be supposed. All this, however, would depend on effective government policies 
and the sensible adaptation of corporations to economic and social needs. 
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